Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company v.
State Tax Commission of Utah : Brief of Defendant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Pratt Kesler; F. Burton Howard; Attorneys for Defendant;
Bryan P. Leverich; A. U. MIner; Howard F. Coray; Scott M. Matheson; Gary L. Theurer; Attorneys
for Plaintiff;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm. Of Utah, No. 10025 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4445

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

APR 1 6 1964
LAW LL.:,\.;(Y

IN THE SUPREM'E COURT
OF THE STATE
~tr

or

R~Ay\

THE OGDEN UNION
AND DEPOT COMPANY,
.
a oorporat1on,
-vs.-

_

2_ 0 \.9tA

t'c..~-

Plainl..;_e-.- .:.,
-cur.r..

_ ..

---------

-~ ----~--(;·... :.

P,...,n...., .__ ... J

..

Case

No.10025

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defenda;nt.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
Upon Writ of Certiorari to Review an Order and
Decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD,
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendan.t

BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
HOWARD F. CORAY
SCOTT M. MATHESON
GARY L. THEURER,
404 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE................

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION ..............................................................................

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW......................................................

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................

2

ARGUMENT..........................................................................................

5

POINT I.
PLAINTIFF, OGDEN UNION RAILWAY & DEPOT
COMPANY, IS A RETAILER WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 59-15-2(e), U.C.A. 1953................

5

POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF, OGDEN UNION RAILWAY &
DEPOT COMPANY, IS REQUIRED TO COLLECT
AND FORWARD SALES TAX ON TAXABLE SERVICES RENDERED FOR OTHERS........................................

16

POINT III.
SERVICES PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF FOR ITS
PARENT COMPANIES ARE TAXABLE UNDER
SECTION 59-15-4(e), U.C.A. 1953, AS REPAIRS,
RENOVATIONS OR INSTALLATIONS OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY RENDERED IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER TANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY ..................................................................................

20

POINT IV.
COAL PURCHASED BY PLAINTIFF OUT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION
IS SUBJECT TO USE TAX WHEN USED IN PROVIDING HEAT FOR OPERATING REVENUE
EQUIPMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S PARENT CORPORATIONS ..................................................................................

26

POINT V.
THE DEPOSITING OF AN UNDERTAKING PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-15-16, U.C.A. 1953, AS A
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO APPEAL, DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE
PAYMENT
THEprovided
TAXby the
HEREIN........
28 Services
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding forOF
digitization
Institute of Museum and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................

30

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
Authorities Cited
American Brake Shoe Co. v. Dept. of Revenue,
25 Ill. 2d 354, 185 N.E. 2d 192...................................... ______________

14

Board of Education of the City of Asbury Park v. Hock,
66 N.J. Super. 231, 168 A. 2d 829..............................................

25

Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. v. Johnson, 157 Me. 380, 173 A. 2d 14L..

9

Boyer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 162 Md. 328, 159 A. 909................

25

Continental Can Co. v. Nudelman, 376 Ill. 446, 34 N.E. 2d 397....

7

Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 11 Utah 2nd 301, 358 P. 2d 352........................

17

E. E. Kelly Co. v. United States, 17 C.C.P.A. 30, 32 (Customs)....

25

Ford J. Twait Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission,
106 Utah 343, 148 P. 2d 343........................................................

19

Francom v. State Tax Commission, 11 Utah 2d 164,
356 P. 2d 285....................................................................................

17

Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170,
209 p. 2d 208..................................................................................

27

Howe v. State Tax Commission, 10 Utah 2d 362,
353 P. 2d 468..................................................................................

17

In Re Bush Terminal Co. (2nd Cir.), 93 F. 2d 661........................

12

Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A. 2d 592....................

25

Northwestern Pacific R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
21 Cal. 2d 524, 133 P. 2d 400........................................................

11

Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Commission,
8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P. 2d 650..........................................................

15

Simmons Hardware Co. v. City of St. Louis (Mo.) 192 S.W. 394

12

State ex rei Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Smith,
342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W. 2d 513..........................................................

28

Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 Ill. 282,
36 N.E. 2d 354.......................... ---··-··························--····---------------·

11

Superior Coal Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 4 Ill. 2d 459,
123 N.E. 2d 713......................... ·-······················--------···----···--····-····

11

Tesche v. Best Concrete Products, Inc., 160 C.A. 2d 256,
325 P. 2d 150..........................................·-···········--·-·······-·-·-··---------··

26

Trico Electric Cooperative v. State Tax Commission,
79 Ariz. 293, 288 P. 2d 782..........................................................

7

Tuttle v. Armstead, 53 Conn. 175, 22 A. 677............ ---····----------------·

29

Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission,
110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879..........................................................

27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
United States v. Public Service Co. of Colorado (C.C.A.
lOth), 143 F. 2d 79..........................................................................

28

Valit·r Coal Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 11 Ill. 2d 402,
143 N.E. 2d 35................................................................................

14

Verdin v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 22 S.W. 447; 33 S.W. 480........

26

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated, 1943
Section 80-16-2 ................................................................................

19

Utah Code Annotated, 1953
Section 59-15-2(a) ................................................................................... .
Section 59-15-2(e) ........................................................ 12, 13, 15, 17, 18
Section 59-15-3 ..............................................................................

6, 17

Section 59-15-4(a) ..........................................................................

18

Section 59-15-4 (b) ..........................................................................

27

Section 59-15-4(e) ................................................... .4, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22
Section 59-15-5 ................................................................................

18, 9

Section 59-15-16 ............................................................................

28

Section 59-15-21 ..............................................................................

29

Section 59-16-3 ................................................................................

26

Other Authorities Cited
64 A.L.R. 2d 769 ....................................................................................

12

Webster's International Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1938................

22

Webster's International Dictionary, 3rd edition, 1961....................

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
.\~D DEPOT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,

-vs.-

Case
No.10025

~TATE

TAX COMMISSION
OF urrAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a sales and use tax deficiency
assessment proposed against the Ogden Union Railway
& Depot Company by the defendant for the period October 1, 1957 to September 30, 1961, in the total amount of
s;j-t,OGS.0-1.

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STATE TAX
CO~E\IISSION

..:\. formal hearing was held before a lawfully constituted quorum of the State Tax Commission of Utah on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

Friday, August 23, 1963, upon petition and notice as
required by law. As a result of this hearing, the State
Tax Commission sustained the deficiency assessment imposing the tax upon the plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the sales and use tax deficiency assessment, or, failing that, a reversal of that
portion of the Tax Commission's decision imposing a
sales tax upon certain services identified under Point III
herein, and in addition plaintiff contests the imposition of
interest on the deficiency, if upheld by this Court, from
the date due until paid.
Plaintiff also seeks a reversal of the use tax portion
of the deficiency assessment upheld by the Tax Commission relating to the consumption of coal by plaintiff
in the direct operation of railroad revenue equipment
belonging to the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific
Railroads.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts herein are not in dispute. The Tax Commission agrees with the plaintiff's statement, but in the
interests of clarity and amplification submits the following summary and additional facts.
The plaintiff, the Ogden Union Railway & Depot
Company, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Union Pacific
and Southern Pacific, each of which owns one-half of its
capital stock except for qualifying shares. Each of these
railroad companies uses the plaintiff's terminal facilities
2
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for their principal passenger and freight terminals at
Ogden, Utah. The principal duty of the plaintiff is to
inspPd, repair and clean all cars arriving at or leaving
the h'rminal facilities in Union Pacific or Southern
Pacific trains.
These cars may belong to many foreign lines but
are usually always in the possession of the Union Pacific
or the Southern Pacific. The plaintiff provides cleaning
mal otlll'r services for all such cars, but no billing is made
to a foreign railroad not having possession of the cars.
The line in possession thereafter bills the foreign line
owllt>r for the services rendered to the particular car.
( R. 42, 44-45)
In the performance of these duties, plaintiff operates the Ogden Terminal; inspects railroad cars in possession of its parent companies; performs light repairs
thereon; sells hay, straw and sand to its parents in connection with the cleaning and bedding of stock cars; and
furnishes labor for washing, loading and unloading of
grain doors, stenciling and other mechanical and cleaning SPITices. (R. 207-210)
The ,·ehicles, tools and other facilities used to provide such serv-ices are either owned or leased by the
Depot Company. (R. 36)
The plaintiff was organized specifically to assist its
parent companies, in duties required of them under federal law and Interstate Commerce Commission regulations.
In addition to sales and services rendered to its parent companies, the plaintiff leases certain parts of its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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facilities to independent third parties and receives re\'~
enue therefrom. In this regard plaintiff receives a percentage of the gross receipts of a snack bar, open to the
public, located in the depot passenger building. (R. 36-37)
Plaintiff also leases space to the U. S. Government
for a railroad mail terminal and receives additional revenue from locker rentals, telephones, and storage, switching and detention or demurrage of railroad cars.
The total amount of income from these sources is
used, pursuant to agreement with its parent companies,
to reduce expenses charged to the parents for the operation and maintenance of the terminal. (R. 37)
Only two railroads provide passenger and freight
service to Ogden City. (R. 41) However, on occasion,
another line may receive the benefit of the services and
activities of the Depot Company. When this happens, a
stipulated fee received for these services is used to reduce the net expense to the Union Pacific and Southern
Pacific. (R. 30) Certain small amounts of income received as rental payments are also used to reduce expenses to the parent companies. (R. 30)
The Tax Commission seeks to impose a tax upon
all amounts paid or charged by plaintiff for:
1. Sand, straw, hay and any other items of tangible
personal property furnished to the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads.
2. Certain services involving repairs, renovations or
installations of tangible personal property as provided in Section 59-15-4( e), U.C.A. 1953, as fully
set forth hereafter.

4
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3. Coal, purchased in Wyoming and used or consumed by plaintiff in the production of heat at its
heating plant in Ogden for the direct operation
of revenue equipment belonging to the parent
companies.
In addition the Commission has contested the plaintiff's claim that interest cannot run from the time the
taxes, in the form of an undertaking on appeal, were deposited with it; and has ordered, in the event its decision is upheld by this Court, that interest shall be due
on the amount of such deficiency as may be upheld, from
the date due until paid.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF, OGDEN UNION RAILWAY &
DEPOT COMPANY, IS A RETAILER WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 59-15-2 (e),
U.C.A.1953.
That plaintiff is a retailer required to collect and pay
taxes has never heretofore been subject to serious
doubt. For at least 10 to 15 years prior to the audit,
plaintiff has filed sales tax returns and collected and paid
sales taxes on sales of sand and straw used for bedding,
and hay used for feeding livestock, sold to the Union
Pacific Company and the Southern Pacific Company.
(R. 35) (R. 213)
~a lt)s

During the period of the audit deficiency, the plaintiff continuously had the sales tax license required by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Section 59-15-3, U.C.A. 1953, of all persons engaging in
business in the State of Utah.
The plaintiff contends that it is not a retailer for
the following reasons :
1. That it repairs and makes installations in behalf of its parent companies and performs all services
at cost and no profit whatsoever is involved. (Pl. Br.
p. 16)
2. That it is not engaged in a regularly organized
retail business. Plaintiff contends that an examination of
its organization as set forth in the stipulation of facts
reveals a most irregular and unique type of business
organization, hardly the type which one would consider
in relation to the definition of a "regularly organized"
retail business. (Pl. Br. p. 17)
3. Plaintiff claims that it performs its entire services for its parent companies and neither attempts to
nor solicits such services for any third parties. It does
no advertising and makes no solicitation of any kind to
the public and that, therefore, it is not "known to the
public'' as being engaged in a retail business of servicing railroad equipment, or in fact any service business
at all. (Pl. Br. p. 17)
4. That the engaging in business in the customary
sense means to voluntarily select an occupation or endeavor and to have control over the manner in which
the activities or work of the business are to be carried
out. Plaintiff claims that these elements are not present

6
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in its current activities because it is required, pursuant
to agreement, to meet the requirements of its parent companics, and the parent companies in turn impose those
requirements on plaintiff in order to comply with federal
law and regulations. (Pl. Br. p. 18)
Regarding plaintiff's contention that profit is necessary before a tax can be imposed upon it, the Illinois case
of Coufinental Can Co. v. Nudelma;n., 376 Ill. 446, 34 N.E.
~d ;{!17 is significant. There, the plaintiffs were manufaduring and business enterprises operating lunchrooms
at which food was sold at cost to their employees. The
Court held that the sales of food to employees measured
a tax, although apparently none of the plaintiffs made
any sale at retail other than those sales to employees in
the lunchroom. In that case, the primary activity of
the taxpayers was not selling at retail, but the Court held
that although the particular activity that measures the
tax is incidental, and not conducted at a profit, that this
does not bar the tax.
A similar claim that profit was necessary in order
to justify the imposition of a sales tax liability was
made in the case of Trico Electric Cooperative v. State
Ta.r Commission, 79 Ariz. 293, 288 P. 2d 782. The State
Commission of Arizona there had levied an assessment
against Trico Electric Cooperative for selling tangible
personal property at retail. The tax was paid under
protPst and suit brought to recover the same. The plaintiff was an electrical cooperative, selling electricity to
its members only, constructing most of, and maintaining
all of. its distribution lines, and to that end making purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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chases of large quantities of material. In making these
purchases, often plaintiff estimated in excess of its needs.
All purchases were made with the intention of using
the same, but with the knowledge that a surplus might
and probably would occur, and that in all probability it
would be necessary in good business practice to dispose
of such surplus. During the period involved, a surplus
of various materials did occur and was sold to various
companies and individuals for their respective consumption and not for resale. The Arizona Supreme Court held
that such sales constitute a separate business of selling
at retail, which was taxable. The following language is
pertinent:
"While the aggregate of these materials were
purchased for consumption to the extent there
would be a need therefor, the excesses were bought
with the knowledge that they might not and
probably would not be consumed and with the
expectation of selling at retail or cost whatever
materials were not needed for consumption. This
was a continuing practice and resulted in advantages accruing to the plaintiff. By purchasing in
carload lots, better prices were enjoyed. The
sales were made with the object in view of securing these advtantages. To place one in the classification of doing business as a retailer, it is not
essential that the activity of selling at retail be
done with the object of realizing a profit directly
from the sales. It is sufficient if the object be any
gain, benefit or advantage, direct or indirect."
The Commission contends that the Depot Company
is adequately compensated for the services or sales it
makes on behalf of its parent companies. This compen8
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sation, which is received from direct charges to the parl)nt ~, is apparently adequate to maintain payrolls, pay
depreciation, buy new equipment and in every way carry
out the plaintiff's business purpose. The presence or ab~t>nre of additional monetary profit to plaintiff can hardly
be dl'terminative of whether or not it is a retailer.
Plaintiff next contends that it is not a retailer because of its irregular organization wherein it is controlled by its parent companies. A similar claim was
made on behalf of a Maine manufacturer and its wholly
owned subsidiary. The Supreme Court of Main in the
case of Bonnar-Vawter, Inc., v. Johnson, 157 Me. 380,
173 A. 2d 141 (1961), spoke directly to both points- both
this point and the issue of profit heretofore raised by
plaintiff. In that case the taxpayer appealed from an
assessment by the state tax assessor against BonnarVawter, Inc. for a use tax and penalty arising out of the
use within the State of Maine of certain printing plates.
The court set forth the facts substantially as follows :
The plates are manufactured in New Hampshire by a
wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff. The president,
board of directors, and other officers are the same in the
two companies. The two corporations maintain separate
books of account and separate corporate balance statements, and also file separate federal income tax returns.
The employees engaged in the manufacture of the plates
are employed by the subsidiary. When the plaintiff rerPin~s a printing order, it orders the plates from the subsidiary, which then orders from various supply houses
the raw materials to make them. The raw materials are
shipped by the suppliers to the subsidiary. No agency
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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agreement existed between plaintiff and subsidiary in
respect to the order for raw materials, and they are not
purchased by the subsidiary as the disclosed agent of the
plaintiff. When received, the materials are carried as
items of inventory on the hooks of the subsidiary. The
invoice when received is approved and is forwarded by
the subsidiary to the plaintiff, who enters an account
payable-trade on its books and then makes payment to
the vendor and then enters an account receivable-Photo
Plate on its books. Photo Plate, the subsidiary, enters
an account payable-Bonnar-Vawter on its books. The
raw materials are then converted into printing plates.
Similar transactions are carried on the books of the
various parties for accounts payable, accounts receivable,
labor costs and other matters fully set forth in the option.
The Court upheld the tax and stated, in referring to a
claim that the subsidiary was not engaged in an activity
with an object of gain, benefit or advantage, either direct
or indirect :
"It will be noted that the statute does not use
the word 'profit.' The statute used the words
'gain, benefit or advantage, either direct or indirect.' These words have a broader meaning than
that of the word profit. One may engage in a
business activity with an object of gain, benefit or
advantage and not necessarily for profit [citing
cases].
''The gain, benefit or advantage may be large
or small, direct or indirect. Although no profit
was made by Photo Plate from its transaction
with the appellant, it is not difficult to discover a
direct or indirect gain, benefit, or advantage therefrom. The charges made by Photo Plate were

10
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madP to cover, in addition to the cost of labor and
materials, 'overhead, depreciation, taxes, etc.' We
must assume from the nature of the plates that
Photo Plate was the owner of equipment necessary in their production. This equipment was subject to depreciation. There was necessarily some
overhead in the maintenance of the corporation .
.:\ pparently, there was a tax liability of some sort.
The eharges made to the appellant and paid for by
it, provided revenue to Photo Plate sufficient to
cover its overhead, taxes, and depreciation, and
thereby to that extent at least, Photo Plate benefited from its transactions with the appellant. We
must conclude that Photo Plate was engaged in
an activity with the object of gain, benefit, or adYantage within the meaning of the word 'business'
as defined in the statute.

"Generally, courts have been reluctant to disregard the legal entity of a corporation, and have
done so with caution and only when necessary in
the interest of justice. The corporate entity will
be disregarded when used to cover fraud or illegality or to justify a wrong. It will not be disregarded when to do so would promote an injustice,
give an unfair advantage, or contravene public
policy....
''In the :field of retail sales tax legislation and
similar tax legislation, courts have generally refused for various reasons to separate the corporarate entities of the parent company and the wholly
owned subsidiary in order to grant relief from
such taxes at the expense of the state. See Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377,
TIL 282, 36 N.E. 2d 354; Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Revenue, 4 Ill. 2d 459, 123 N.E. 2d
713: ~ orthwestern Pacific R. Co. v. State Board
of Equalization, 21 Cal. 2d 524, 133 P. 2d 400; In
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

Re Bush Terminal Co., 2 Cir., 93 F. 2d 661; Simmons Hardware Co. v. City of St. Louis, 192 S.W.
394; 64 A.L.R. 2d 769.
''In the instant case, the appellant did not
cause the plates to be manufactured by its own
company. It elected to organize a subsidiary company to manufacture the plates. The reason for
so doing was not disclosed by the stipulation. We
must assume, however, that some economic advantage resulted therefrom. A corporation ought not
to be able to take whatever advantages are gained
by maintaining a subsidiary as a separate entity,
and at the same time cast aside that entity whenever it becomes a burden. We see no reason under the circumstances of this case, for applying
the rule that allows the corporate entity to be
disregarded. ''
Plaintiff's argument that it is not a retailer appears
to be based in large measure upon that part of the Utah
statutory definition providing that ''The term 'retailer'
means a person doing a regularly organized retail business in tangible personal property, known to the public
as such ... " (emphasis supplied). See Section 59-15-2(e)
U.C.A. 1953.
The term "doing a regularly organized retail business in tangible personal property" apparently does not
contemplate the service activity carried on by the plaintiff. Rather, it contemplates a continuous and systematic
course of sales activity involving the passage of title to
personal property as contrasted with the isolated and
occasional sales transactions which are exempt from tax.
Because only a small portion of the tax liability
proposed by the Tax Commission is based upon sales of
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tangible personal property, the question of whether or
not plaintiff is doing a regularly organized retail business
in tangible personal property, known to the public as
such, loses much of its applicability in the present controversy.
Many retail businesses have a small or limited public. The Tax Commission believes that no retail business
C'stablishment in the State of Utah is known to the entire
general public. A retail department store is known by
a larger segment of the public than is a home barbershop
or repair shop. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that both
consider themselves a retailers and are treated as such
by city and state taxing authorities. The size of the public
segment served by a retailer cannot control the nature of
the business operation unless so minimal as to constitute
a sale, by a person who would otherwise be a retailer,
an isolated and occasional sale. See Section 59-15-2 (e),
U.C.A. 1953.
The Tax Commission submits that where there is a
regular and continuous course of rendering taxable sales
or services that the requirement of being known to the
public is satisfied when the retailers' activities are known
to the particular element of the public which normally
receives the benefit or end product of the general sales
activity of the retailer.
1

Regarding the claim that plaintiff did not voluntarily select nor control the activities sought to be taxed by
the Commission and derives no profit therefrom, plain1
Much of the Tax Commission's response in this regard is derived from
the unpublished decision of Wabash Rail-road Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, decided
by the Supreme Court of Illinois, February 1, 1963.
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tiff cites the case of Valier Coal Co. v. Department of
Revewue, 11 Ill. 2d 402, 143 N.E. 2d 35 (1957). This
case is the subject of an extensive annotation in 64
A.L.R. 2d 769.
As it involves the Illinois Retailers' occupation tax
upon "persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail ... " It should not control the disposition of this case where the tax is on
every retail sale of tangible personal property and upon
amounts paid and charged for certain services. 2
As far as the matter of duty is concerned, the Tax
Commission thinks that the Depot Company unduly exaggerates both the element of compulsion and its legal
significance. Whether the duty to repair the cars of
other railroads results from an agreement among the railroads themselves, or is imposed by federal law or regulation apart from any contractual basis, is not controlling.
In neither case is the plaintiff compelled to provide the
services sought to be taxed, the obligation to make the
repairs and provide the services in question is only a
consequence of its decision to do so. The incidence of
the tax depends upon the conduct involved, and not upon
the influence that impels that conduct. The conduct here
involved is the making of repairs, renovations and installations to tangible personal property and sales of such
property, and that conduct falls within the statute.
2 The Illinois tax is on the occupation and not on the sale. The act does
not demand a tax unless the occupation to be taxed is selling personal property
at retail.
American Brake Shoe Co. V. Department of Revenue, 25 Ill. 2d 354, 185

N. E. 2d 192.

14
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Plaintiff argues that if it is not a "retailer" then
sales by it to others which would otherwise be taxable
are renden'd exempt. By making this contention plaintiff o\·Prlooks the fact that the sales tax in Utah is imposed not upon ''retailers'' but upon ''retail sales.''
~Petion

59-15-2 (e) defines the term retail sale as
'' ('t'rry sale within the State of Utah by a retailer or
wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such sales as are
ddined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by
the terms of this act . . . '' (Emphasis supplied).
The Utah statute provides exemption for isolated
and occasional sales and sales by certain agricultural
producers. See 59-15-2(e). No sales of automobiles between private parties are exempt by reason of the isolated and occasional sale exemption. It is apparent, however, that the private parties to a sale of an automobile
are not ''retailers'' and under the interpretation of the
act urged by plaintiff would owe no tax on such a sale.
A similar argument was urged upon this Court in the
case of Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P. 2d 650 (1958). The
Court there said :

''As to the contention that the Sales Tax Act
is applicable only to sales made by licensed retailers, we disagree .... We believe the plain wording
of the amendments clearly displays a legislative
intent to tax all motor vehicle sales not exempted,
irrespective of the vendor's personality or status,
and did not mean to tax only sales of motor vehicles by licensed retailers . . . ''
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Similarly, the Tax Commission submits that as the
tax is upon every ''retail sale'' and as ''retail sale'' is
every sale by a retailer or wholesaler except those sales
otherwise exempted by the act, plaintiff's contention in
effect reopens questions settled by the P.I.E. case, supra,
and would eliminate the tax on the sale of an automobile by private parties.
The Commission submits that the better rule is to
tax all sales within the state except those otherwise
exempt. In the case of sales the Utah statute provides
taxation as the rule and exemption as the exception.

POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF, OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
& DEPOT COMPANY, IS REQUIRED TO COLLECT AND FORWARD SALES TAX ON TAXABLE SERVICES RENDERED FOR OTHERS.
Plaintiff, in its brief, argues that it is not a retailer
doing a regularly organized retail business, known to
the public as such. It then reasons that because it is not
such a retailer it is not required to collect and forward
sales tax on sales of taxable services to its parent
companies.
It agrees that some of the services it performs ''constitute repairs, renovations or installations within the
customary and ordinary meaning of those terms'' (Pl.
Br. p. 6), but contends that if it is not a "retailer under
the Sales Tax Act definition, it is outside the scope of

16
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hoth the sales tax on tangible personal property and the
sales tax on services as well." (Pl. Br. p. 12)
By this plea, plaintiff would negate the tax on all
services. By definition a "retailer" is "a person doing
a regularly organized retail business in tangible perso'YUJ,l
propl'rfy .. . " (emphasis supplied). If a sale of tangible
personal property by a service-oriented retail establishment is necessary before the service tax can be imposed, Section 59-15-4(e), U.C.A. 1953, is rendered meaningless, and hundreds of thousands of dollars previously
paid to the state 3 have been collected erroneously.
During the period of the controversy, as here before
the plaintiff at all times was licensed as required
by Section 59-15-3, U.C.A. 1953. The present language of
the license statute dates from prior to 1939, when the
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, Section 3, required a
license of "any wholesaler, retailer or proprietor ... "
(emphasis supplied). In 1939 this language was changed
by Chapter 103, Laws of 1939, to delete the words "retailer or proprietor" and exact the license only of "persons required by the provisions of this act to collect the
tax.'' The 1939 amendment thus evidenced a legislative
intention that persons other than retailers or proprietors
could be required to collect the tax.
~tated,

The definition of ''retailer'' as provided by Section
59-15-2 (e) has been in existence since the adoption of
3 The collection of which, at least by implication, was approved by this
Court in the following cases: Ft'ancom v. Utah State Tax Commission, 11 Utah
2d 301, 356 P. 2d 285; Howe 11. State Tax Commission, 10 Utah 2d 362, 353
P. 2d 468; Denvef' & Rio Gt'ande W estef'n R. R. Co. 11. State Tax Commission,
11 Utah 2d 301, 358 P. 2d 352.
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the Sales Tax Act. On the other hand, the services tax
was adopted by Chapter 113 of the Laws of Utah 1959.
Pertinent provisions of the current act provide:
"59-15-4. ExmsE TAx - RATE - From and
after the effective date of this act, there is levied
and there shall be collected and paid :
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible
personal property made within the State of
Utah ...
(e) A tax equivalent to 21j2 per cent of the
amount paid or charged for all services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property, or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in connection with other tangible
personal property.''
Thus, the present statute requires a sales tax to be
levied and paid upon retail sales of tangible personal
property, and also an independently levied tax to be paid
upon transactions involving services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property.
Section 59-15-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part:
''Every person receiving any payment or consideration upon a sale of property or service subject to the tax under the provisions of this act, or
to whom such payment or consideration is payable
(hereinafter called the vendor) shall be responsible for the collection of the amount of the tax
imposed on said sales ... ''
Section 59-15-2 (e) defines ''person'' as :
''any individual, firm, co-partnership, joint adventure, corporation, estate or trust, or any

18
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group or
plural as
intention
closed by

combination acting as a unit and the
well as the singular number, unless the
to give a more limited meaning is disthe context.''

It would appear, therefore, that the plaintiff is a
statutory "person" and that, therefore, it is subject to
the collection provision of Section 59-15-5, on a transaction taxable by virtue of Section 59-15-4( e), and that
whether or not it is a "retailer" is immaterial to its liability for the tax upon services.
In the analogous case of Ford J. Twaits Co. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, the Tax Commission imposed a use tax liability upon contractors who
purchased materials on their own account for construction of federal ordnance plants in Utah. The contractor
contended in that case that the Utah Use Tax Act, Section 80-16-2(j), provided that the retailer, as that term
is used in the Act, was responsible for the collection of the
tax, and when collected that it was a debt due from the
retailer to the State. It further argued that it was not
such a retailer. The contractors, however, could be included under the term ''taxpayers,'' which was defined
by Section 80-16-2 as :
"every person storing, using or consuming tangible personal property, the storage, use or consumption of which is subject to the tax imposed
by this act when such tax is not paid to a retailer."
The Utab Supreme Court said :
"Since it is not claimed that the contractors
paid the ta:s: to the people from whom they made
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these purchases, whether they were 'retailers' or
not, they are included in the term 'taxpayer' as
used here. 80-16-7 provides for making of returns
and payments by 'every taxpayer.' As shown
above, in this case the contractors are taxpayers.''
106 Utah 343, 347.
So here, whether or not the plaintiff is a retailer is
immaterial in view of the fact that it is a "person" required to collect tax on a series of transactions which
are determined to be taxable by the Utah Code.
Because of the fact that the majority of transactions
subjected to tax by the defendant involve services rendered and not sales of tangible personal property, the
question of whether or not it is known to the public as
operating such a retail business loses much of its applicability to the present controversy.
The Tax Commission submits that the Utah Sales
Tax Act is intended to impose a sales tax on all taxable
sales, exchanges of property, and services, and that
unless the plaintiff falls within the provisions of some
particular exemption statute that the sale of tangible
personal property or rendering of services is subject
to the tax.
POINT III.
SERVICES PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF
FOR ITS PARENT COMPANIES ARE TAXABLE UNDER SECTION 59-15-4( e), U.C.A.1953,
AS REPAIRS, RENOVATIONS OR INSTALLATIONS OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY RENDERED IN CONNECTION WITH
OTHER TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY.
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The Commission concedes that Section 59-15-4 (e)
doPs not impose a tax upon all services as contended by
plaintiff in its brief.
It is submitted, however, that if a certain service is
taxable under this section it is not made less so by its
in<'l us ion by plaintiff in a nonrepair account. The Tax
Commtssion will not concede to the plaintiff or to the
IntC'rstate Commerce Commission the power to determine the applicability of the Utah tax on services.
The Commission does claim that the following services are taxable :
1. The cleaning of passenger cars and cabooses.
2. The washing of exteriors of diesel cab windows,
which consists of washing and wiping of walls and equipment, mopping floors, vacuuming rugs, and removal of
refuse and garbage.
3. Checking heating, lighting and cooling systems in
passenger cars.
4. :Maintaining the charge on battery systems in passenger cars.
5. Lubricating of cars in transportation train service, which service consists of inspection, maintaining
waste levels and oiling car journal boxes.
6. Stenciling baggage trucks and benches.
7. Coopering and reclaiming grain doors.
8. Cleaning, disinfecting and bedding stock cars.
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Charges for the above mentioned services are sought
to be taxed by the Commission as ''amounts paid or
charged for all services for repairs or renovations of
tangible personal property, or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in connection with other
tangible personal property'' as provided in Section
59-15-4(e), U.C.A. 1953.
In order to determine whether or not the above
enumerated services are taxable under Section 59-15-4(e),
it becomes necessary to define what is meant by repairs,
renovations or installations.
Webster's International Dictionary, 2nd Ed. (1938),
defines these terms as follows :
1. Repairs. n.

5. pl. Accounting, the sum total of renewals and
replacements during a given period.
1. Repair. n.
1. Act or process of repairing; restoration to a

sound or good state, after decay, dilapidation, injury, loss, waste, etc.
The same dictionary does not define ''renovations.''
It does define the verb "renovate" in the manner indicated by plaintiff. In addition it states:
Renovation. n.
Act or process of renovating, or state of being
renovated, renewed or revived.
22
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The verb" renovate" is defined:
3. To renew, make over, or repair; to restore
to freshness, purity, a sound state, newness of appearance, etc., as to reno ua.te draperies, or a house
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
In addition plaintiff cites several additional definitions of these words as both verbs and nouns from the
same dictionary. The Tax Commission does not dispute
any of the definitions of actual terms in question.

It is submitted, however, that these particular words
have acquired new connotations in the ever-changing
complexity of the English language since the 1938 date
of that edition of the dictionary. In this regard, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961 edition,
defines ''renovate'' :
1. To restore to life, vigor activity; 2. To restore to a former state (as of freshness, soundness, purity, or newness of appearance) ; make
over.

Repair:
1 (a). The act or process of repairing; restoration to a state of soundness, efficiency, or health;
(b) An instance or result of repairing; 3. Repairs
(pl.) The portion of maintenance charges expended to keep fixed assets in adequate and efficient
operating condition and recorded on the books as
expense - contrasted with renewal and replacement.''

Under modern definitions, it would appear that:
1. Services in cleaning passenger cars and cabooses
would constitute a renovation under the definition as a
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restoration to a former state of freshness, soundness or
newness of appearance. Similarly, services of washing
the exterior windows in the cabs of diesel units, cleaning
interiors of dining cars, cleaning and washing train markers, and services in cleaning, sanding and disinfecting
livestock cars would constitute a similar renovation under
Utah statutes.
Under the definition defining repairs as the act or
process of repairing or restoration to a state of soundness or efficiency, services rendered in testing and checking heating, lighting and cooling systems and maintaining the charge on battery systems, as well as services in
lubricating cars in transportation service, would be
repairs taxable under the Utah statute.
Services in stenciling identification, loading grain
doors, reclaiming or removing grain doors, adjusting
shippers' ladings, stripping, or disconnecting cables and
removing batteries from the dining car, would constitute
installation services taxable under the Utah statutes. In
addition, as the accounts included within the proposed
sales tax deficiency assessment on services performed by
the plaintiff on behalf of the Union Pacific and Southern
Pacific Railroads during the period involved are charged
on the books of the plaintiff as expenses and represent
charges expended to keep fixed assets of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific in adequate and efficient operating condition, such charges are properly deemed
"repairs" under the provisions of the Utah statutes, as
defined by Webster's Third International Dictionary,
1961 edition.
24
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The following court decisions furnish further support for the Tax Commission's construction of these
terms.
''Repair'' commonly embraces not only restoration,
but also renovation or renewal by any process of making
good, strengthening, supplying or mending. "Repair"
of interstate railway, constituting work in "interstate
commerce,'' includes whatever may be necessary to keep
subsisting railway, its structures, and equipment in safe
state for interstate traffic, or to maintain and improve
that state. Boyer v. Pewnsylvania R. Co., 162 Md. 328,
159 A. 909, 911.
"Repair" is work done on an existing structure or
thing which has become imperfect by reason of action of
elements or otherwise. Board of Ed. of City of Asbury
Park v. Hock, 66 N. J. Super. 231, 168 A. 2d 829, 936.
''Repair'' consists of correction of condition which
has become defective because of injury or deterioration
over a period of time and restores the original condition.
.llasterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A. 2d '592, 598.
In absence of any showing that the word ''repairs''
has a restricted meaning, in trade and commerce, it includes ''maintenance painting of a ship, since the words
''maintain'' and ''maintenance'' are frequently used in
the sense of keeping a thing in good condition by means
of repairs. E. E. Kelly & Co., v. United States, 17
C.C.P.A. 30, 32 (Customs).
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The words ''maintain'' and ''repair'' practirally
mean one and the same thing. Verdin v. City of St. Lo,uis,
Mo., 27 S.W. 447, 451, 33 S.W. 480, 494.
Under the same definitions cited by plaintiff, tlw
Court in Tesche v. Best Concrete Products, Inc., 160 C.A.
2d 256, 325 P. 2d 150, found "repair" to encompass certain cleaning operations, including the removal of cement
which had adhered to a cement mixer. A California
State Safety Order there required certain controls when
the mixer was in use during repair work.
POINT IV.
COAL PURCHASED BY PLAINTIFF OUT OF
THE STATE FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION
IS SUBJECT TO USE TAX WHEN USED IN
PROVIDING HEAT FOR OPERATING REVENUE EQUIPMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S PARENT CORPORATIONS.
Plaintiff purchased coal outside the State of Utah
for use within the state in connection with the production
of heat for the direct operation of Union Pacific and
Southern Pacific Revenue equipment.
As the coal was purchased and consumed by the
plaintiff, it is subject to use tax under the provisions of
Section 59-16-3, U.C.A. 1953, unless otherwise exempt.
This section provides :
''There is levied and imposed an excise tax on
the storage, use or other consumption in this state
of tangible personal property purchased for storage, use or other consumption in this state at the
rate of 2:Y2 % of the sales price of such property.
26
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"~~~n·ry person storing, using or otherwise
consuming in this state tangible personal property
purchased shall be liable for the tax imposed by
this act, and the liability shall not be extinguished
until the tax has been paid to this state."

Plaintiff correctly states the applicability of sales
tax cx(lmptions to the use tax. Because of the rule of
Gnu'l'a Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah
170, 209 P. 2d 208 ( 1949), the only sales of coal properly
subject to use taxation are those provided by Section
.->9-1r>-4(b), U.C.A. 1953, which states that a tax equivalent to 2 11 ~ per cent of the amount paid:
"(2) To any person as defined in this act including municipal corporations for gas, electricity,
heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished
for domestic or commercial consumption.... ''

shall be collected and paid.
The Tax Commission submits that consumption of
coal so purchased by plaintiff herein clearly constitutes
··commercial consumption'' within the meaning of the
Utah statute.
Coal sold for industrial consumption has been exempt from Utah sales and use taxation since 1943. See
rniou Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission,
110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879.
The imposition of a tax on ''commercial consumption'' does not manifest an intention to tax energy sold
for industrial consumption, and the word ''commercial''
is not intended to include all business activities. The
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Commission agrees that the term ''commercial'' may
have a broad or a narrow scope. The broad meaning
encompasses all business, while the narrow sense includes
only those enterprises buying or selling goods or services.
See United States v. Public Service Co. of Colorado,
(C.C.A. Colo.), 143 F. 2d 79.
The plaintiff cites the case of State ex rel. Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W.
2d 513. There, electricity sold to a company to propel
its cars over its streetcar system was determined not
to be used for commercial purposes.
Here, however, the sale of coal to plaintiff is for
the production of heat for the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads, not for plaintiff's own use and
benefit.
Plaintiff receives benefits from the production of
such heat. As it receives these benefits from services it
provides to others, its consumption is hardly the same as
that in State v. Smith, supra.
Plaintiff's corporate survival depends upon its business of providing service for others. It receives tangible
benefits in return for such services. It is actively engaged
in the commercial furnishing of services to its parent
companies, and coal purchased and used for this purpose is sold or furnished to plaintiff for commercial
consumption.
POINT V.
THE DEPOSITING OF AN UNDERTAKING
PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-15-16, U.C.A.
28
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1953, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
APPEAL, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PAYMENT OF THE TAX HEREIN.
Plaintiff asserts that by paying all taxes and interest assessed by the Tax Commission it is relieved of
further interest charges accruing after such undertaking
is filed.
The Tax Commission contends that the filing of
~u('h an undertaking does not constitute a payment of
taxes. The Commission does not have full use and control of amounts so paid because of the fact that should the
taxpayer prevail the deposit must be refunded.
Revenue collected from sales taxes is required by
Section 59-15-21, U.C.A., to be deposited daily with the
State Treasurer and credited to the state general fund.
To construe an undertaking as payment of tax is to
require the depositing of funds so paid in the general
fund of the State of Utah. Such money is thereafter
subject to distribution or appropriation to state purposes.
Should the decision in this case require the return
to the taxpayer of amounts deposited as an undertaking,
the Tax Commission would then be powerless to effect a
refund of monies so paid. And it is further possible that
the funds could have been appropriated to some state
purpose as to be unavailable for refund through other
than legislative action.
Payment implies the existence of a debt, of a party
to whom it is owed, and of satisfaction of the debt to the
party. Tuttle v. Armstead, 53 Conn. 175, 22 A. 677, 678.
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As plaiintiff's appeal herein constitutes a denial of
tax liability and as the Tax Commission's participation in
this appeal constitutes a denial of satisfaction, it is obvious that "payment" of the tax cannot be made until
after this Court renders a decision on this matter.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff sells tangible personal property within
the State of Utah. It also performs taxable services. The
fact that the market for these sales and services is relatively limited cannot be determinative of whether or not
they are taxable. Both sales and service are continuous
and for the corporate benefit of the Depot Company. The
only market for plaintiff's commercial activities is fully
and adequately served thereby.
For these reasons the Tax Commission urges that its
decision be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD,
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant

30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

